Corporate concentration, government advertising, major advertisers, and political alignments can shape the news agenda without the need for direct censorship.

International studies on “media capture” find concrete examples in Argentina of a problem that cuts across governments, corporations, and ideological orientations.

The most obvious way to control a media outlet is through censorship: banning a
publication, shutting down a radio station, obstructing an investigation, or persecuting a journalist.
But there is a much more difficult method to detect. It doesn’t require closing newspapers or dictating
what a journalist can say. It can operate while media outlets continue to publish,
radio stations broadcast, television channels air, and hundreds of websites compete every minute for the
public’s attention.
This is known as “media capture”: when certain economic,
corporate, or political dependencies acquire enough power to compromise the autonomy of the
media.
Andrea Prat and David Strömberg study this issue in *The Political Economy of Mass
Media*. The central point is that the formal existence of press freedom does not, in itself, guarantee
that the information system will be independent. Economic incentives,
media ownership, and their relationship with governments and private actors can also determine what
information ultimately reaches the public.
Argentina offers a particularly interesting area for analyzing this phenomenon.
Many screens, few owners.
A media system is not necessarily pluralistic simply because there are numerous newspapers, channels,
radio stations, or online news sites.
The fundamental question is different: who is behind these media outlets?
The Media Ownership Monitor, conducted in Argentina by Reporters Without Borders and Tiempo
Argentino, warned about the existing levels of concentration in the country and rated
the risk related to audience concentration and regulatory safeguards
designed to limit ownership concentration as high.
The study, based primarily on data from 2017 and 2018 and therefore not a
current snapshot of the market, found that the eight largest owners controlled
approximately 59.24% of the combined audiences for television, radio, and newspapers, with
Grupo Clarín leading the way with 25.28%.
This historical data is important because it allows us to observe a structure that has been
developing for years.
And during 2026, the concentration once again became the focus of public discussion, this time
around telecommunications.
Telecom’s purchase of Telefónica Móviles Argentina led the national government itself to
impose conditions before allowing the operation. According to an official statement from the
National Competition Authority, without divestments, the acquisition could leave approximately
70% of telecommunications services in the hands of a single economic group. For this
reason, Telecom was required to divest six million mobile customers, return spectrum
, and cede fixed internet customers in localities where the resulting company would exceed 50% of the
market.
Telecom is linked in its shareholding to Grupo Clarín and Fintech. This does not
automatically imply editorial control over all the information circulating through these networks. But
it demonstrates the extent to which, in the modern ecosystem, content, television, connectivity,
telephony, and digital distribution can become integrated around large conglomerates.
The discussion about concentration, therefore, can no longer be limited to counting newspapers or channels.
It must also consider who controls the channels through which information circulates.
He who pays also has power
. Another major potential constraint is advertising.
The study «Paying the Piper: Government Advertising and Media Bias,» by Alejandro Beltran,
Daniele Guariso, and Omar Guerrero, provides empirical evidence on a long-debated question : what happens when a media outlet is financially dependent on government
advertising funds ? The research finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that greater dependence on government advertising may be associated with more favorable coverage of those who manage the funds and more negative coverage of certain adversaries. This does not mean that every media outlet that receives government advertising is beholden to the government that distributes it. That would be a simplistic conclusion. The issue is different: the greater the economic dependence, the greater the potential for pressure from those who manage the money. Argentina offers particularly interesting examples. Argentine Advertising: National, Provincial, and City Governments. The government of Javier Milei decided to suspend institutional advertising campaigns by the national administration at the beginning of his term. This suspension was subsequently extended and remains in effect through 2026. At first glance, one might assume that this completely eliminated national government advertising . This was not exactly the case.

The reduction affected the central government’s advertising budget, but state-owned companies
continued to invest in advertising.
An investigation by Chequeado, based on official information, determined that Banco Nación
allocated $30.411 billion to media advertising during 2025. In real terms, this spending
represented a 31% increase compared to 2024 and an 86.6% increase compared to 2023. The bank also
refused to disclose details of the media outlets and journalists among whom these resources were distributed,
citing commercial and strategic reasons.
YPF is another significant case: during 2025, it allocated approximately $129 billion to
advertising, according to data compiled by Chequeado. The specific distribution of these resources
also gave rise to demands for access to public information.
This reveals a first Argentine paradox: there can be «zero advertising» in the central government
and, simultaneously, significant advertising investment by
state-controlled companies.
But this phenomenon is not exclusive to the national government.
Buenos Aires: $58.3 billion in one year.
In 2025, the province of Buenos Aires allocated approximately $58.3 billion to
official advertising, according to a survey of nearly 90 resolutions conducted by Chequeado.
In real terms, spending increased by 63% compared to 2024. Grupo Indalo led the
distribution with 12.2% of the provincial advertising budget; followed by Grupo Olmos, Grupo América,
Grupo Clarín, and El Destape.
The distribution is particularly illustrative.
C5N received approximately $4.025 billion; América TV, $1.661 billion; Canal 13, $1.828 billion; and
El Destape’s website, $2.192 billion. There were also investments in radio, digital sites,
streaming platforms, and content distributed via YouTube.
The Province maintains that it seeks a diverse distribution based on the characteristics,
reach, and target audience of each campaign.
But there is an institutional problem that goes beyond any specific beneficiary: there is no
provincial law establishing an objective and mandatory formula for distributing these resources, and
contracts are decided administratively by the Provincial Media Secretariat.
The problem, then, is not simply identifying who receives money.
It is determining what rules prevent that money from becoming an
editorial reward or punishment.
The City also advertises.
The City of Buenos Aires offers another example.
During 2024, the last year for which
complete recipients were published at the time of the survey, the Buenos Aires City Government spent approximately $99 billion on
official advertising.
Grupo Clarín received around 10.7% of the total and was the media conglomerate with
the largest share. More than a third of the city’s investment was allocated to
outdoor advertising.
The survey also indicates that the City, like the Province of Buenos Aires, lacks
a general law establishing objective criteria for distributing advertising funds.
This means that politically opposed administrations maintain different mechanisms
, but both are affected by the same structural problem: enormous state discretion over
resources that are economically significant for media companies.
And this is precisely the problem raised by Paying the Piper.
It’s not necessary to demonstrate that an official calls a news director to understand the
risk.
The mere fact that a government can increase, reduce, or eliminate significant revenue
for a media outlet creates a power dynamic.
Large private advertisers can also exert influence.
Reducing the problem solely to government advertising would be a mistake, however.
Private advertising can also exert pressure.
Banks, oil companies, telecommunications firms, laboratories, supermarkets,
insurance companies, technology companies, and large industrial groups can represent
significant percentages of a media outlet’s revenue.
The potential conflict arises when the company that a newsroom should be investigating
is, at the same time, one of its main clients.
Again, it’s not necessary to imagine an explicit order.
The question may arise earlier:
Do we investigate our main advertiser?
Does the story receive the same front page coverage?
Does it remain for several days?
Is a journalist sent to investigate further?
Or does it slowly disappear from the agenda?
The most sophisticated manipulation can begin precisely there.
When the media are also political actors
, Daniel Hallin, Philip Kitzberger, and Manel Palos-Pons introduce another element especially
relevant to understanding Argentina: political parallelism.
Their research on Latin America argues that the links between media and politics in the
region do not always reproduce the ideal model of journalism as an independent observer.
Alignments can be organized around leaders, governments, economic elites, or
Deep political divisions exist, and in certain circumstances, the media themselves
actively participate in these conflicts.
Argentina occupies a specific place in this analysis.
The authors study the confrontation that developed during the Kirchner era, particularly
during the presidency of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, as an example in which
certain media outlets ceased to function merely as observers and became
protagonists in the political dispute.
This phenomenon does not necessarily disappear when the government changes.
Allies, adversaries, favored or disadvantaged media outlets, and the
discourses used may change.
But a risk remains: that a significant portion of journalism will end up
being structured around the friend-enemy logic of politics itself.
Then every news item begins to be interpreted according to who benefits and who is harmed.
Argentina and the deterioration of press freedom.
The problem also develops in a context of growing tension between political power and
journalism.
In its 2026 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders ranked Argentina
98th out of 180 countries, eleven positions lower than the previous year. The organization
attributed the decline, among other factors, to increased institutional hostility toward the
press and episodes of violence against journalists during demonstrations.
RSF also points to a deeper economic problem: Argentine media outlets have been experiencing
financial difficulties for years, while the most powerful groups belong to a
small number of conglomerates with interests in other economic activities.
Economic insecurity is not a separate problem from independence.
An economically vulnerable media outlet is easier to influence.
Concentration also shapes reality.
UNESCO maintains that pluralism requires a combination of public, private, and
community media, as well as a diversity of platforms and owners, precisely to prevent
concentration from reducing the range of opinions available to citizens.
This point is crucial.
Because concentration doesn’t just mean that a company makes a lot of money.
In communication, it also means that a small number of people can acquire
enormous power to decide:
what story leads a newscast;
what investigation makes the front page;
which leader is interviewed;
who is presented as an expert;
Which scandal lingers for weeks;
and which event vanishes after a few hours?
The most efficient media manipulation doesn’t even need to fabricate fake news.
It can simply prioritize some truths and conceal others.
Censorship that needs no censors
. International studies and Argentine data lead to an uncomfortable conclusion.
The threat to pluralism doesn’t come exclusively from the State.
It can come from a government that arbitrarily manages official advertising.
From a public company that distributes hundreds or thousands of millions without
adequately disclosing its containers.
From a large business group that concentrates media outlets and other businesses.
From a private advertiser indispensable for the financial survival of a newsroom.
Or from a media outlet that progressively becomes a player in a political dispute.
These are different powers, even opposing ones, but capable of producing similar effects.
That’s why it would be a mistake to reduce the debate to determining whether certain media outlets are «pro-government»
or «opposition.»
The democratic question is much deeper.
Can a journalist freely investigate those who pay their salaries, finance their companies, or have
the power to determine their economic survival?
True pluralism.
Freedom of the press demands that no government can tell a journalist what to publish.
But it also requires something more.
That no businessperson can control a disproportionate part of the information system.
That government advertising be distributed according to transparent, verifiable, and objective criteria.
Those citizens know who owns each media outlet.
That there be a diversity of ownership.
That small, regional, community, and independent projects can survive.
And that advertising, both public and private, does not become an indirect mechanism for
disciplining newsrooms.
Because a society can have hundreds of channels, radio stations, newspapers, websites, and streaming services and yet
hear a surprisingly small number of voices.
The real danger begins when political power, economic power, and
media power cease to check each other and begin to depend on each other.
In that scenario, censorship no longer needs a censor.
And the most powerful manipulation doesn’t necessarily consist of convincing society of a
lie.
It consists of ensuring that whatever makes those in power uncomfortable never occupy the center of
public discourse.